Original release date: December 3, 2018

Description

Notification

This report is provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

14 files were submitted for analysis. These files are designed to encrypt a victim’s system files for a ransom payment.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:

Submitted Files (17)

036071786d7db553e2415ec2e71f3967baf51bdc31d0a640aa4afb87d3ce3050 (samsam.exe)

0f2c5c39494f15b7ee637ad5b6b5d00a3e2f407b4f27d140cd5a821ff08acfac (samsam.exe)

32445c921079aa3e26a376d70ef6550bafeb1f6b0b7037ef152553bb5dad116f (selfdel.exe)

45e00fe90c8aa8578fce2b305840e368d62578c77e352974da6b8f8bc895d75b (samsam.exe)

553967d05b83364c6954d2b55b8cfc2ea3808a17c268b2eee49090e71976ba29 (553967d05b83364c6954d2b55b8cfc…)

58ef87523184d5df3ed1568397cea65b3f44df06c73eadeb5d90faebe4390e3e (samsam.exe)

6245a51e78526c25510d0aa0909576119fdf0244619f670036538063b88f1c21 (HELP_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.html)

6bc2aa391b8ef260e79b99409e44011874630c2631e4487e82b76e5cb0a49307 (samsam.exe)

7aa585e6fd0a895c295c4bea2ddb071eed1e5775f437602b577a54eef7f61044 (samsam.exe)

89b4abb78970cd524dd887053d5bcd982534558efdf25c83f96e13b56b4ee805 (samsam.exe)

939efdc272e8636fd63c1b58c2eec94cf10299cd2de30c329bd5378b6bbbd1c8 (samsam.exe)

946dd4c4f3c78e7e4819a712c7fd6497722a3d616d33e3306a556a9dc99656f4 (samsam.exe)

979692a34201f9fc1e1c44654dc8074a82000946deedfdf6b8985827da992868 (samsam.exe)

97d27e1225b472a63c88ac9cfb813019b72598b9dd2d70fe93f324f7d034fb95 (del.exe)

a763ed678a52f77a7b75d55010124a8fccf1628eb4f7a815c6d635034227177e (samsam.exe)

e682ac6b874e0a6cfc5ff88798315b2cb822d165a7e6f72a5eb74e6da451e155 (samsam.exe)

ffef0f1c2df157e9c2ee65a12d5b7b0f1301c4da22e7e7f3eac6b03c6487a626 (samsam.exe)

Domains (10)

anonyme.com

evilsecure9.wordpress.com

followsec7.wordpress.com

key88secu7.wordpress.com

keytwocode.wordpress.com

lordsecure4u.wordpress.com

payforsecure7.wordpress.com

secangel7d.wordpress.com

union83939k.wordpress.com

zeushelpu.wordpress.com

Findings

0f2c5c39494f15b7ee637ad5b6b5d00a3e2f407b4f27d140cd5a821ff08acfac

Tags

dropperransomwaretrojan

Details
Name samsam.exe
Size 218624 bytes
Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
MD5 a14ea969014b1145382ffcd508d10156
SHA1 ff6aa732320d21697024994944cf66f7c553c9cd
SHA256 0f2c5c39494f15b7ee637ad5b6b5d00a3e2f407b4f27d140cd5a821ff08acfac
SHA512 73f28bed4ee700e15d1c0eb9871e37bdda77e3ef3c14b63a1597b9628e7407dc31f8382e0ec52c8c65f68c00a4f321f5971359f865eb35b35dc62e9f5e8e7be1
ssdeep 3072:ZVdp01i6vcHV1LI5FLV0pZeZKfOJizjrBnNtRg+ur199J+n9fCbP:Za1i6UHVyLV0poZa1jrD099on9
Entropy 6.249245
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Samas
Antiy Trojan/Win32.SGeneric
Avira TR/Ransom.lhumd
BitDefender Generic.Ransom.SamSam.12451789
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Samas-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.MPPP-7951
ESET MSIL/Filecoder.AR trojan
Emsisoft Generic.Ransom.SamSam.12451789 (B)
Ikarus Trojan-Ransom.SamSam
K7 Trojan ( 700000121 )
McAfee Ransomware-SAMAS!A14EA969014B
Microsoft Security Essentials Ransom:MSIL/Samas.A
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.Ransom.eamswz
Quick Heal Trojan.Inject.TL3
Sophos Troj/RansmSam-A
Symantec Trojan.Gen.2
Systweak malware.gen-r
TrendMicro Ransom_CRYPSAM.B
TrendMicro House Call Ransom_CRYPSAM.B
Vir.IT eXplorer Trojan.Win32.MSIL9.BGXA
VirusBlokAda Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Samas
Zillya! Dropper.Agent.Win32.229787
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches
97 036071786d7db553e2415ec2e71f3967baf51bdc31d0a640aa4afb87d3ce3050
PE Metadata
Compile Date 2016-01-05 19:14:43-05:00
Import Hash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744
Company Name Microsoft
File Description MicrosoftSAM
Internal Name samsam.exe
Legal Copyright Copyright \xa9 2014
Original Filename samsam.exe
Product Name MicrosoftSAM
Product Version 2.4.8.4
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
37c3e95eb9901183e02df0ba1de6caf2 header 512 2.774592
7a556f246357051b2d82ea445571ddbb .text 216064 6.270810
d0b581056989efaa1de31a61a8f4a9ec .rsrc 1536 4.110334
06441ad348b483e2458a535949e809cf .reloc 512 0.101910
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C# v7.0 / Basic .NET
Relationships
0f2c5c3949… Connected_To union83939k.wordpress.com
0f2c5c3949… Dropped 6245a51e78526c25510d0aa0909576119fdf0244619f670036538063b88f1c21
0f2c5c3949… Dropped 32445c921079aa3e26a376d70ef6550bafeb1f6b0b7037ef152553bb5dad116f
0f2c5c3949… Dropped 97d27e1225b472a63c88ac9cfb813019b72598b9dd2d70fe93f324f7d034fb95
Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows .NET compiled executable designed to encrypt victim system files for a ransom payment. This file is a variant of SamSam ransomware. It contains two embedded 32-bit Windows executables in its resource section:

–Begin resource–
“samsam.del.exe” ==> del.exe (SDelete) designed to securely delete files
“samsam.selfdel.exe” ==> selfdel.exe designed to delete the SamSam ransomware from the victim’s system
–End resource–

It installs the embedded files into the following directory:

–Begin files installed–
%Currentdirectory%\del.exe
%Currentdirectory%\Selfdel.exe
–End files installed–

This file is designed to accept an input text file as the command line argument. The input text file contains an RSA public key in the following format:

–Begin RSA public key–
“<RSAKeyValue><Modulus>Base64 encoded RSA public key</Modulus><Exponent>AQAB</Exponent></RSAKeyValue>”
–End RSA public key–

The input text file was not available for analysis.

Displayed below is the code snippet designed to accept an input text file as the command-line argument:

–Begin command line argument–
private static void Main(string[] args)
{
   if (args.Length != 1)
   {
       return;
   }
   if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(args[0]))
   {
       Program.publickey = File.ReadAllText(args[0]);
   }
   Program.create_from_resource();
–End command line argument–

It searches the drives installed on the victim system for files with the following file extensions:

–Begin file extensions–
“xls”,”.xlsx”,”.pdf”,”.doc”,”.docx”,”.ppt”,”.pptx”,”.txt”,”.dwg”,”.bak”,”.bkf”,”.pst”,”.dbx”,”.zip”,”.rar”,”.mdb”,”.asp”,”.aspx”,”.html”,”.htm”,”.dbf”,”.3dm”,”.3ds”,”.3fr”,”.jar”,”.3g2″,”.xml”,”.png”,”.tif”,”.3gp”,”.java”,”.jpe”,”.jpeg”,”.jpg”,”.jsp”,”.php”,”.3pr”,”.7z”,”.ab4″,”.accdb”,”.accde”,”.accdr”,”.accdt”,”.ach”,”.kbx”,”.acr”,”.act”,”.adb”,”.ads”,”.agdl”,”.ai”,”.ait”,”.al”,”.apj”,”.arw”,”.asf”,”.asm”,”.asx”,”.avi”,”.awg”,”.back”,”.backup”,”.backupdb”,”.pbl”,”.bank”,”.bay”,”.bdb”,”.bgt”,”.bik”,”.bkp”,”.blend”,”.bpw”,”.c”,”.cdf”,”.cdr”,”.cdr3″,”.cdr4″,”.cdr5″,”.cdr6″,”.cdrw”,”.cdx”,”.ce1″,”.ce2″,”.cer”,”.cfp”,”.cgm”,”.cib”,”.class”,”.cls”,”.cmt”,”.cpi”,”.cpp”,”.cr2″,”.craw”,”.crt”,”.crw”,”.phtml”,”.php5″,”.cs”,”.csh”,”.csl”,”.tib”,”.csv”,”.dac”,”.db”,”.db3″,”.db-journal”,”.dc2″,”.dcr”,”.dcs”,”.ddd”,”.ddoc”,”.ddrw”,”.dds”,”.der”,”.des”,”.design”,”.dgc”,”.djvu”,”.dng”,”.dot”,”.docm”,”.dotm”,”.dotx”,”.drf”,”.drw”,”.dtd”,”.dxb”,”.dxf”,”.dxg”,”.eml”,”.eps”,”.erbsql”,”.erf”,”.exf”,”.fdb”,”.ffd”,”.fff”,”.fh”,”.fmb”,”.fhd”,”.fla”,”.flac”,”.flv”,”.fpx”,”.fxg”,”.gray”,”.grey”,”.gry”,”.h”,”.hbk”,”.hpp”,”.ibank”,”.ibd”,”.ibz”,”.idx”,”.iif”,”.iiq”,”.incpas”,”.indd”,”.kc2″,”.kdbx”,”.kdc”,”.key”,”.kpdx”,”.lua”,”.m”,”.m4v”,”.max”,”.mdc”,”.mdf”,”.mef”,”.mfw”,”.mmw”,”.moneywell”,”.mos”,”.mov”,”.mp3″,”.mp4″,”.mpg”,”.mrw”,”.msg”,”.myd”,”.nd”,”.ndd”,”.nef”,”.nk2″,”.nop”,”.nrw”,”.ns2″,”.ns3″,”.ns4″,”.nsd”,”.nsf”,”.nsg”,”.nsh”,”.nwb”,”.nx2″,”.nxl”,”.nyf”,”.oab”,”.obj”,”.odb”,”.odc”,”.odf”,”.odg”,”.odm”,”.odp”,”.ods”,”.odt”,”.oil”,”.orf”,”.ost”,”.otg”,”.oth”,”.otp”,”.ots”,”.ott”,”.p12″,”.p7b”,”.p7c”,”.pab”,”.pages”,”.pas”,”.pat”,”.pcd”,”.pct”,”.pdb”,”.pdd”,”.pef”,”.pem”,”.pfx”,”.pl”,”.plc”,”.pot”,”.potm”,”.potx”,”.ppam”,”.pps”,”.ppsm”,”.ppsx”,”.pptm”,”.prf”,”.ps”,”.psafe3″,”.psd”,”.pspimage”,”.ptx”,”.py”,”.qba”,”.qbb”,”.qbm”,”.qbr”,”.qbw”,”.qbx”,”.qby”,”.r3d”,”.raf”,”.rat”,”.raw”,”.rdb”,”.rm”,”.rtf”,”.rw2″,”.rwl”,”.rwz”,”.s3db”,”.sas7bdat”,”.say”,”.sd0″,”.sda”,”.sdf”,”.sldm”,”.sldx”,”.sql”,”.sqlite”,”.sqlite3″,”.sqlitedb”,”.sr2″,”.srf”,”.srt”,”.srw”,”.st4″,”.st5″,”.st6″,”.st7″,”.st8″,”.std”,”.sti”,”.stw”,”.stx”,”.svg”,”.swf”,”.sxc”,”.sxd”,”.sxg”,”.sxi”,”.sxi”,”.sxm”,”.sxw”,”.tex”,”.tga”,”.thm”,”.tlg”,”.vob”,”.war”,”.wallet”,”.wav”,”.wb2″,”.wmv”,”.wpd”,”.wps”,”.x11″,”.x3f”,”.xis”,”.xla”,”.xlam”,”.xlk”,”.xlm”,”.xlr”,”.xlsb”,”.xlsm”,”.xlt”,”.xltm”,”.xltx”,”.xlw”,”.ycbcra”,”.yuv”
–End file extensions–

The malware avoids encrypting files in the “Windows”, “Reference Assemblies\\Microsoft”, and “Recycle.bin” folders:

Displayed below is the code snippet used to avoid encrypting files in the folders:

–Begin code–
if (path != Program.sysdir + “Windows” && !path.Contains(“Reference Assemblies\\Microsoft”) && !path.Contains(“Recycle.Bin”))
–End code–

It randomly generates the following keys for encrypting the target files:

–Begin randomly generates keys–
AES key (16 bytes)
AES IV (16 bytes)
Signature key (64 bytes) for SHA256 HMAC key calculation
–End randomly generates keys–

Displayed below is the code snippet for generating the unique keys for a target file:

–Begin key generation–
public static string Encrypt(string plainFilePath, string encryptedFilePath, string manifestFilePath, string rsaKey)
{
   byte[] signatureKey = encc.GenerateRandom(64); ===> HMAC key
   byte[] key = encc.GenerateRandom(16); ==> Rijndael key
   byte[] iv = encc.GenerateRandom(16); ==> Rijndael IV
   encc.EncryptFile(plainFilePath, encryptedFilePath, key, iv, signatureKey, rsaKey);
   return null;
–End key generation–

It reads the target file into memory and encrypts it using an AES algorithm in CBC mode with the generated AES keys. The encrypted data from the original file is stored into a newly created file. This file has the same name as the original file, but has an “.encryptedRSA” extension. The ransomware calculates a SHA-256 HMAC of the encrypted data of the file.

The generated keys are encrypted using the RSA public key from the key file. The malware Base64 encodes and prepends the following data in XML format at the beginning of the encrypted file:

–Begin Base64 encodes data–
AES key, encrypted with RSA public key
AES IV, encrypted with RSA public key
SHA-256H MAC of the encrypted file data
HMAC key, encrypted with RSA public key
–End Base64 encodes data–

Displayed below is the code used to RSA encrypt and Base64 encode the data prepended at the beginning of each encrypted file.

–Begin encrypting and encoding–
byte[] inArray = encc.CalculateSignature(encryptedFilePath, signatureKey);
string text = Convert.ToBase64String(encc.RSAEncryptBytes(key, rsaKey));
string text2 = Convert.ToBase64String(encc.RSAEncryptBytes(iv, rsaKey));
string text3 = Convert.ToBase64String(inArray);
string text4 = Convert.ToBase64String(encc.RSAEncryptBytes(signatureKey, rsaKey));
string str = string.Concat(new object[]
{
   “<MtAeSKeYForFile>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<Key>”,
   text, ==> Base64 encoded AES key, encrypted with RSA public key with OAEP padding
   “</Key>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<IV>”,
   text2, ==> Base64 encoded AES IV, encrypted with RSA public key with OAEP padding
   “</IV>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<Value>”,
   text3, ==> Base64 encoded SHA-256 HMAC of the encrypted file data
   “</Value>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<EncryptedKey>”,
   text4, ==> Base64 encoded HMAC key, encrypted with RSA public key with OAEP padding
   “</EncryptedKey>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<OriginalFileLength>”,
   fileInfo.Length, ==> The length of the original file
   “</OriginalFileLength>”,
   encc.sn,
   “</MtAeSKeYForFile>”
});
–End encrypting and encoding–

Following the encryption of the victim’s files, the ransomware executes “selfdel.exe” to delete itself from the system and installs the ransomware note “HELP_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.html” onto the victim’s system.

Displayed below is the embedded blog and Bitcoin address for the ransomware note:

–Begin blog and Bitcoin address–
Blog address: “http[:]//union83939k.wordpress.com”
Bitcoin address: 19CbDoaZDLTzkkT1uQrMPM42AUvfQN4Kds
–End blog and Bitcoin address–

7aa585e6fd0a895c295c4bea2ddb071eed1e5775f437602b577a54eef7f61044

Tags

ransomwaretrojan

Details
Name samsam.exe
Size 218112 bytes
Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
MD5 14721036e16587594ad950d4f2db5f27
SHA1 ed1797c282f0817d2ad8f878f8dd50ab062501ac
SHA256 7aa585e6fd0a895c295c4bea2ddb071eed1e5775f437602b577a54eef7f61044
SHA512 4d9e75850713f0bf6892fca8d74f462a5b2c0ccec2ed089fd830b8babcce7aedbd3bcb56e25c81cb6bf285bba9111ef89913d0c665593b2ba8da5f57d9505d32
ssdeep 3072:gUOsdp01i6vcHV1LI5FLV0pZeZKfOJizjrBnNtRg+ur199JWbk9f7b1v:gzL1i6UHVyLV0poZa1jrD099Qbk9V
Entropy 6.248108
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Samas
Antiy Trojan[Ransom]/MSIL.Samas
Avira TR/Ransom.lhumd
BitDefender Generic.Ransom.SamSam.B120689A
Cyren W32/Trojan.HBQK-8340
ESET a variant of MSIL/Filecoder.AR trojan
Emsisoft Generic.Ransom.SamSam.B120689A (B)
Ikarus Trojan-Ransom.SamSam
K7 Trojan ( 700000121 )
McAfee Ransomware-SAMAS!14721036E165
Microsoft Security Essentials Ransom:MSIL/Samas.A
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.Samas.eajeha
Quick Heal Trojan.Inject.TL3
Sophos Troj/RansmSam-A
Symantec Ransom.SamSam!gen1
Systweak trojan-spy.filecryptor
TrendMicro Ransom_.2933F726
TrendMicro House Call Ransom_.2933F726
Vir.IT eXplorer Trojan.Win32.Atros3.CWX
VirusBlokAda Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Samas
Zillya! Trojan.Filecoder.Win32.2108
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C# v7.0 / Basic .NET
Relationships
7aa585e6fd… Dropped 6245a51e78526c25510d0aa0909576119fdf0244619f670036538063b88f1c21
7aa585e6fd… Dropped 32445c921079aa3e26a376d70ef6550bafeb1f6b0b7037ef152553bb5dad116f
7aa585e6fd… Dropped 97d27e1225b472a63c88ac9cfb813019b72598b9dd2d70fe93f324f7d034fb95
7aa585e6fd… Connected_To union83939k.wordpress.com
Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows .NET compiled executable designed to encrypt victim system files for a ransom payment. This file is a variant of SamSam ransomware. It contains two embedded 32-bit Windows executables in its resource section:

–Begin resource–
“samsam.del.exe” ==> del.exe (SDelete) designed to securely delete files
“samsam.selfdel.exe” ==> selfdel.exe designed to delete the SamSam ransomware from the victim’s system
–End resource–

It installs the embedded files into the following directory:

–Begin files installed–
%Currentdirectory%\del.exe
%Currentdirectory%\Selfdel.exe
–End files installed–

This file is designed to accept an input text file as the command line argument. The input text file contains an RSA public key in the following format:

–Begin RSA public key–
“<RSAKeyValue><Modulus>Base64 encoded RSA public key</Modulus><Exponent>AQAB</Exponent></RSAKeyValue>”
–End RSA public key–

The input text file was not available for analysis.

Displayed below is the code snippet designed to accept an input text file as the command-line argument:

–Begin command line argument–
private static void Main(string[] args)
{
   if (args.Length != 1)
   {
       return;
   }
   if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(args[0]))
   {
       Program.publickey = File.ReadAllText(args[0]);
   }
   Program.create_from_resource();
–End command line argument–

It searches the drives installed on the victim system for files with the following file extensions:

–Begin file extensions–
“xls”,”.xlsx”,”.pdf”,”.doc”,”.docx”,”.ppt”,”.pptx”,”.txt”,”.dwg”,”.bak”,”.bkf”,”.pst”,”.dbx”,”.zip”,”.rar”,”.mdb”,”.asp”,”.aspx”,”.html”,”.htm”,”.dbf”,”.3dm”,”.3ds”,”.3fr”,”.jar”,”.3g2″,”.xml”,”.png”,”.tif”,”.3gp”,”.java”,”.jpe”,”.jpeg”,”.jpg”,”.jsp”,”.php”,”.3pr”,”.7z”,”.ab4″,”.accdb”,”.accde”,”.accdr”,”.accdt”,”.ach”,”.kbx”,”.acr”,”.act”,”.adb”,”.ads”,”.agdl”,”.ai”,”.ait”,”.al”,”.apj”,”.arw”,”.asf”,”.asm”,”.asx”,”.avi”,”.awg”,”.back”,”.backup”,”.backupdb”,”.pbl”,”.bank”,”.bay”,”.bdb”,”.bgt”,”.bik”,”.bkp”,”.blend”,”.bpw”,”.c”,”.cdf”,”.cdr”,”.cdr3″,”.cdr4″,”.cdr5″,”.cdr6″,”.cdrw”,”.cdx”,”.ce1″,”.ce2″,”.cer”,”.cfp”,”.cgm”,”.cib”,”.class”,”.cls”,”.cmt”,”.cpi”,”.cpp”,”.cr2″,”.craw”,”.crt”,”.crw”,”.phtml”,”.php5″,”.cs”,”.csh”,”.csl”,”.tib”,”.csv”,”.dac”,”.db”,”.db3″,”.db-journal”,”.dc2″,”.dcr”,”.dcs”,”.ddd”,”.ddoc”,”.ddrw”,”.dds”,”.der”,”.des”,”.design”,”.dgc”,”.djvu”,”.dng”,”.dot”,”.docm”,”.dotm”,”.dotx”,”.drf”,”.drw”,”.dtd”,”.dxb”,”.dxf”,”.dxg”,”.eml”,”.eps”,”.erbsql”,”.erf”,”.exf”,”.fdb”,”.ffd”,”.fff”,”.fh”,”.fmb”,”.fhd”,”.fla”,”.flac”,”.flv”,”.fpx”,”.fxg”,”.gray”,”.grey”,”.gry”,”.h”,”.hbk”,”.hpp”,”.ibank”,”.ibd”,”.ibz”,”.idx”,”.iif”,”.iiq”,”.incpas”,”.indd”,”.kc2″,”.kdbx”,”.kdc”,”.key”,”.kpdx”,”.lua”,”.m”,”.m4v”,”.max”,”.mdc”,”.mdf”,”.mef”,”.mfw”,”.mmw”,”.moneywell”,”.mos”,”.mov”,”.mp3″,”.mp4″,”.mpg”,”.mrw”,”.msg”,”.myd”,”.nd”,”.ndd”,”.nef”,”.nk2″,”.nop”,”.nrw”,”.ns2″,”.ns3″,”.ns4″,”.nsd”,”.nsf”,”.nsg”,”.nsh”,”.nwb”,”.nx2″,”.nxl”,”.nyf”,”.oab”,”.obj”,”.odb”,”.odc”,”.odf”,”.odg”,”.odm”,”.odp”,”.ods”,”.odt”,”.oil”,”.orf”,”.ost”,”.otg”,”.oth”,”.otp”,”.ots”,”.ott”,”.p12″,”.p7b”,”.p7c”,”.pab”,”.pages”,”.pas”,”.pat”,”.pcd”,”.pct”,”.pdb”,”.pdd”,”.pef”,”.pem”,”.pfx”,”.pl”,”.plc”,”.pot”,”.potm”,”.potx”,”.ppam”,”.pps”,”.ppsm”,”.ppsx”,”.pptm”,”.prf”,”.ps”,”.psafe3″,”.psd”,”.pspimage”,”.ptx”,”.py”,”.qba”,”.qbb”,”.qbm”,”.qbr”,”.qbw”,”.qbx”,”.qby”,”.r3d”,”.raf”,”.rat”,”.raw”,”.rdb”,”.rm”,”.rtf”,”.rw2″,”.rwl”,”.rwz”,”.s3db”,”.sas7bdat”,”.say”,”.sd0″,”.sda”,”.sdf”,”.sldm”,”.sldx”,”.sql”,”.sqlite”,”.sqlite3″,”.sqlitedb”,”.sr2″,”.srf”,”.srt”,”.srw”,”.st4″,”.st5″,”.st6″,”.st7″,”.st8″,”.std”,”.sti”,”.stw”,”.stx”,”.svg”,”.swf”,”.sxc”,”.sxd”,”.sxg”,”.sxi”,”.sxi”,”.sxm”,”.sxw”,”.tex”,”.tga”,”.thm”,”.tlg”,”.vob”,”.war”,”.wallet”,”.wav”,”.wb2″,”.wmv”,”.wpd”,”.wps”,”.x11″,”.x3f”,”.xis”,”.xla”,”.xlam”,”.xlk”,”.xlm”,”.xlr”,”.xlsb”,”.xlsm”,”.xlt”,”.xltm”,”.xltx”,”.xlw”,”.ycbcra”,”.yuv”
–End file extensions–

The malware avoids encrypting files in the “Windows”, “Reference Assemblies\\Microsoft”, and “Recycle.bin” folders:

Displayed below is the code snippet used to avoid encrypting files in the folders:

–Begin code–
if (path != Program.sysdir + “Windows” && !path.Contains(“Reference Assemblies\\Microsoft”) && !path.Contains(“Recycle.Bin”))
–End code–

It randomly generates the following keys for encrypting the target files:

–Begin randomly generates keys–
AES key (16 bytes)
AES IV (16 bytes)
Signature key (64 bytes) for SHA256 HMAC key calculation
–End randomly generates keys–

Displayed below is the code snippet for generating the unique keys for a target file:

–Begin key generation–
public static string Encrypt(string plainFilePath, string encryptedFilePath, string manifestFilePath, string rsaKey)
{
   byte[] signatureKey = encc.GenerateRandom(64); ===> HMAC key
   byte[] key = encc.GenerateRandom(16); ==> Rijndael key
   byte[] iv = encc.GenerateRandom(16); ==> Rijndael IV
   encc.EncryptFile(plainFilePath, encryptedFilePath, key, iv, signatureKey, rsaKey);
   return null;
–End key generation–

It reads the target file into memory and encrypts it using an AES algorithm in CBC mode with the generated AES keys. The encrypted data from the original file is stored into a newly created file. This file has the same name as the original file, but has an “.encryptedRSA” extension. The ransomware calculates a SHA-256 HMAC of the encrypted data of the file.

The generated keys are encrypted using the RSA public key from the key file. The malware Base64 encodes and prepends the following data in XML format at the beginning of the encrypted file:

–Begin Base64 encodes data–
AES key, encrypted with RSA public key
AES IV, encrypted with RSA public key
SHA-256H MAC of the encrypted file data
HMAC key, encrypted with RSA public key
–End Base64 encodes data–

Displayed below is the code used to RSA encrypt and Base64 encode the data prepended at the beginning of each encrypted file.

–Begin encrypting and encoding–
byte[] inArray = encc.CalculateSignature(encryptedFilePath, signatureKey);
string text = Convert.ToBase64String(encc.RSAEncryptBytes(key, rsaKey));
string text2 = Convert.ToBase64String(encc.RSAEncryptBytes(iv, rsaKey));
string text3 = Convert.ToBase64String(inArray);
string text4 = Convert.ToBase64String(encc.RSAEncryptBytes(signatureKey, rsaKey));
string str = string.Concat(new object[]
{
   “<MtAeSKeYForFile>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<Key>”,
   text, ==> Base64 encoded AES key, encrypted with RSA public key with OAEP padding
   “</Key>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<IV>”,
   text2, ==> Base64 encoded AES IV, encrypted with RSA public key with OAEP padding
   “</IV>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<Value>”,
   text3, ==> Base64 encoded SHA-256 HMAC of the encrypted file data
   “</Value>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<EncryptedKey>”,
   text4, ==> Base64 encoded HMAC key, encrypted with RSA public key with OAEP padding
   “</EncryptedKey>”,
   encc.sn,
   “<OriginalFileLength>”,
   fileInfo.Length, ==> The length of the original file
   “</OriginalFileLength>”,
   encc.sn,
   “</MtAeSKeYForFile>”
});
–End encrypting and encoding–

Following the encryption of the victim’s files, the ransomware executes “selfdel.exe” to delete itself from the system and installs the ransomware note “HELP_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.html” onto the victim’s system.

Displayed below is the embedded blog and Bitcoin address for the ransomware note:

–Begin blog and Bitcoin address–
blog address: “http://union83939k.wordpress.com”
Bitcoin address: 19CbDoaZDLTzkkT1uQrMPM42AUvfQN4Kds
–End blog and Bitcoin address–

union83939k.wordpress.com

URLs
  • http://union83939k.wordpress.com
Whois

Domain Name: WORDPRESS.COM
Registry Domain ID: 21242797_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.markmonitor.com
Registrar URL: http://www.markmonitor.com
Updated Date: 2017-01-12T22:53:10Z
Creation Date: 2000-03-03T12:13:23Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2020-03-03T12:13:23Z
Registrar: MarkMonitor Inc.
Registrar IANA ID: 292
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abusecomplaints@markmonitor.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.2083895740
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Domain Status: serverDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverDeleteProhibited
Domain Status: serverTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverTransferProhibited
Domain Status: serverUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverUpdateProhibited
Name Server: NS1.WORDPRESS.COM
Name Server: NS2.WORDPRESS.COM
Name Server: NS3.WORDPRESS.COM
Name Server: NS4.WORDPRESS.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of whois database: 2018-03-27T18:16:17Z <<<
NetRange:     192.0.64.0 – 192.0.127.255
CIDR:         192.0.64.0/18
NetName:        AUTOMATTIC
NetHandle:     NET-192-0-64-0-1
Parent:         NET192 (NET-192-0-0-0-0)
NetType:        Direct Assignment
OriginAS:     AS2635
Organization: Automattic, Inc (AUTOM-93)
RegDate:        2012-11-20
Updated:        2012-11-20
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-192-0-64-0-1

OrgName:        Automattic, Inc
OrgId:         AUTOM-93
Address:        60 29th Street #343
City:         San Francisco
StateProv:     CA
PostalCode:     94110
Country:        US
RegDate:        2011-10-05
Updated:        2013-11-01
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/AUTOM-93

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE3970-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: Abuse
OrgAbusePhone: +1-877-273-8550
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@automattic.com
OrgAbuseRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE3970-ARIN

OrgTechHandle: NOC12276-ARIN
OrgTechName: NOC
OrgTechPhone: +1-877-273-8550
OrgTechEmail: ipadmin@automattic.com
OrgTechRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NOC12276-ARIN

OrgNOCHandle: NOC12276-ARIN
OrgNOCName: NOC
OrgNOCPhone: +1-877-273-8550
OrgNOCEmail: ipadmin@automattic.com
OrgNOCRef:    https://whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NOC12276-ARIN

Relationships
union83939k.wordpress.com Connected_From 0f2c5c39494f15b7ee637ad5b6b5d00a3e2f407b4f27d140cd5a821ff08acfac
union83939k.wordpress.com Connected_From 7aa585e6fd0a895c295c4bea2ddb071eed1e5775f437602b577a54eef7f61044

036071786d7db553e2415ec2e71f3967baf51bdc31d0a640aa4afb87d3ce3050

Tags

dropperransomwaretrojan

Details
Name samsam.exe
Size 218624 bytes
Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
MD5 fe998080463665412b65850828bce41f
SHA1 203bb8ec1da6b237a092bab71fa090849c7db9bd
SHA256 036071786d7db553e2415ec2e71f3967baf51bdc31d0a640aa4afb87d3ce3050
SHA512 9ade6edde3f063fc935f53366ffc9cb6cf7e17691d22fd2fe107d779da3b61eaed006ef7679b456bc16aca8b686d035f09aaf42bf06fa62b872e0a89046994eb
ssdeep 3072:bVdp01i6vcHV1LI5FLV0pZeZKfOJizjrBnNtRg+ur199J+n9fCbM:ba1i6UHVyLV0poZa1jrD099on9
Entropy 6.249304
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Samas
Antiy Trojan/Win32.SGeneric
Avira TR/Ransom.lhumd
BitDefender Generic.Ransom.SamSam.CDB17A36
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Samas-1
Cyren W32/SamSam.D.gen!Eldorado
ESET MSIL/Filecoder.AR trojan
Emsisoft Generic.Ransom.SamSam.CDB17A36 (B)
Ikarus Trojan-Ransom.SamSam
K7 Trojan ( 700000121 )
McAfee Ransomware-SAMAS!FE9980804636
Microsoft Security Essentials Ransom:MSIL/Samas.A
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.Ransom.eamenb
NetGate Trojan.Win32.Malware
Quick Heal Trojan.Inject.TL3
Sophos Troj/RansmSam-A
Symantec Ransom.SamSam!gen1
Systweak malware.gen-r
TrendMicro Ransom_.2933F726
TrendMicro House Call Ransom_.2933F726
Vir.IT eXplorer Trojan.Win32.MSIL9.BGXA
VirusBlokAda Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Samas
Zillya! Dropper.Agent.Win32.229787
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches
97 0f2c5c39494f15b7ee637ad5b6b5d00a3e2f407b4f27d140cd5a821ff08acfac
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C# v7.0 / Basic .NET
Relationships
036071786d… Dropped 6245a51e78526c25510d0aa0909576119fdf0244619f670036538063b88f1c21
036071786d… Dropped 32445c921079aa3e26a376d70ef6550bafeb1f6b0b7037ef152553bb5dad116f
036071786d… Dropped 97d27e1225b472a63c88ac9cfb813019b72598b9dd2d70fe93f324f7d034fb95
036071786d… Connected_To keytwocode.wordpress.com
Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows .NET compiled executable designed to encrypt victim system files for a ransom payment. This file is a variant of SamSam ransomware. It contains two embedded 32-bit Windows executables in its resource section:

–Begin resource–
“samsam.del.exe” ==> del.exe (SDelete) designed to securely delete files
“samsam.selfdel.exe” ==> selfdel.exe designed to delete the SamSam ransomware from the victim’s system
–End resource–

It installs the embedded files into the following directory:

–Begin files installed–
%Currentdirectory%\del.exe
%Currentdirectory%\Selfdel.exe
–End files installed–

This file is designed to accept an input text file as the command line argument. The input text file contains an RSA public key in the following format:

–Begin RSA public

Revisions

  • December 3, 2018: Initial version

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.